[1.3.x] Added ALLOWED_HOSTS setting for HTTP host header validation.

carljm · aaugustin · commit 27cd872e6e36 · 2013-02-12T11:41:43.000+01:00
This is a security fix; disclosure and advisory coming shortly.
diff --git a/django/conf/global_settings.py b/django/conf/global_settings.py
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
 #   * Receive x-headers
 INTERNAL_IPS = ()
 
+# Hosts/domain names that are valid for this site.
+# "*" matches anything, ".example.com" matches example.com and all subdomains
+ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']
+
 # Local time zone for this installation. All choices can be found here:
 # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_zones_by_name (although not all
 # systems may support all possibilities).
diff --git a/django/conf/project_template/settings.py b/django/conf/project_template/settings.py
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
     }
 }
 
+# Hosts/domain names that are valid for this site; required if DEBUG is False
+# See https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/{{ docs_version }}/ref/settings/#allowed-hosts
+ALLOWED_HOSTS = []
+
 # Local time zone for this installation. Choices can be found here:
 # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_zones_by_name
 # although not all choices may be available on all operating systems.
diff --git a/django/http/__init__.py b/django/http/__init__.py
@@ -168,11 +168,15 @@ def get_host(self):
             if server_port != (self.is_secure() and '443' or '80'):
                 host = '%s:%s' % (host, server_port)
 
-        # Disallow potentially poisoned hostnames.
-        if not host_validation_re.match(host.lower()):
-            raise SuspiciousOperation('Invalid HTTP_HOST header: %s' % host)
-
-        return host
+        if settings.DEBUG:
+            allowed_hosts = ['*']
+        else:
+            allowed_hosts = settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS
+        if validate_host(host, allowed_hosts):
+            return host
+        else:
+            raise SuspiciousOperation(
+                "Invalid HTTP_HOST header (you may need to set ALLOWED_HOSTS): %s" % host)
 
     def get_full_path(self):
         # RFC 3986 requires query string arguments to be in the ASCII range.
@@ -704,3 +708,43 @@ def str_to_unicode(s, encoding):
     else:
         return s
 
+def validate_host(host, allowed_hosts):
+    """
+    Validate the given host header value for this site.
+
+    Check that the host looks valid and matches a host or host pattern in the
+    given list of ``allowed_hosts``. Any pattern beginning with a period
+    matches a domain and all its subdomains (e.g. ``.example.com`` matches
+    ``example.com`` and any subdomain), ``*`` matches anything, and anything
+    else must match exactly.
+
+    Return ``True`` for a valid host, ``False`` otherwise.
+
+    """
+    # All validation is case-insensitive
+    host = host.lower()
+
+    # Basic sanity check
+    if not host_validation_re.match(host):
+        return False
+
+    # Validate only the domain part.
+    if host[-1] == ']':
+        # It's an IPv6 address without a port.
+        domain = host
+    else:
+        domain = host.rsplit(':', 1)[0]
+
+    for pattern in allowed_hosts:
+        pattern = pattern.lower()
+        match = (
+            pattern == '*' or
+            pattern.startswith('.') and (
+                domain.endswith(pattern) or domain == pattern[1:]
+                ) or
+            pattern == domain
+            )
+        if match:
+            return True
+
+    return False
diff --git a/django/test/utils.py b/django/test/utils.py
@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ def setup_test_environment():
     mail.original_email_backend = settings.EMAIL_BACKEND
     settings.EMAIL_BACKEND = 'django.core.mail.backends.locmem.EmailBackend'
 
+    settings._original_allowed_hosts = settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS
+    settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']
+
     mail.outbox = []
 
     deactivate()
@@ -97,6 +100,9 @@ def teardown_test_environment():
     settings.EMAIL_BACKEND = mail.original_email_backend
     del mail.original_email_backend
 
+    settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS = settings._original_allowed_hosts
+    del settings._original_allowed_hosts
+
     del mail.outbox
 
 
diff --git a/docs/ref/settings.txt b/docs/ref/settings.txt
@@ -82,6 +82,42 @@ of (Full name, e-mail address). Example::
 Note that Django will e-mail *all* of these people whenever an error happens.
 See :doc:`/howto/error-reporting` for more information.
 
+.. setting:: ALLOWED_HOSTS
+
+ALLOWED_HOSTS
+-------------
+
+Default: ``['*']``
+
+A list of strings representing the host/domain names that this Django site can
+serve. This is a security measure to prevent an attacker from poisoning caches
+and password reset emails with links to malicious hosts by submitting requests
+with a fake HTTP ``Host`` header, which is possible even under many
+seemingly-safe webserver configurations.
+
+Values in this list can be fully qualified names (e.g. ``'www.example.com'``),
+in which case they will be matched against the request's ``Host`` header
+exactly (case-insensitive, not including port). A value beginning with a period
+can be used as a subdomain wildcard: ``'.example.com'`` will match
+``example.com``, ``www.example.com``, and any other subdomain of
+``example.com``. A value of ``'*'`` will match anything; in this case you are
+responsible to provide your own validation of the ``Host`` header (perhaps in a
+middleware; if so this middleware must be listed first in
+:setting:`MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES`).
+
+If the ``Host`` header (or ``X-Forwarded-Host`` if
+:setting:`USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST` is enabled) does not match any value in this
+list, the :meth:`django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()` method will raise
+:exc:`~django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation`.
+
+When :setting:`DEBUG` is ``True`` or when running tests, host validation is
+disabled; any host will be accepted. Thus it's usually only necessary to set it
+in production.
+
+This validation only applies via :meth:`~django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()`;
+if your code accesses the ``Host`` header directly from ``request.META`` you
+are bypassing this security protection.
+
 .. setting:: ALLOWED_INCLUDE_ROOTS
 
 ALLOWED_INCLUDE_ROOTS
diff --git a/docs/releases/1.3.6.txt b/docs/releases/1.3.6.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+==========================
+Django 1.3.6 release notes
+==========================
+
+*February 19, 2013*
+
+This is the sixth bugfix/security release in the Django 1.3 series.
+
+Host header poisoning
+---------------------
+
+Some parts of Django -- independent of end-user-written applications -- make
+use of full URLs, including domain name, which are generated from the HTTP Host
+header. Django's documentation has for some time contained notes advising users
+on how to configure webservers to ensure that only valid Host headers can reach
+the Django application. However, it has been reported to us that even with the
+recommended webserver configurations there are still techniques available for
+tricking many common webservers into supplying the application with an
+incorrect and possibly malicious Host header.
+
+For this reason, Django 1.3.6 adds a new setting, ``ALLOWED_HOSTS``, which
+should contain an explicit list of valid host/domain names for this site. A
+request with a Host header not matching an entry in this list will raise
+``SuspiciousOperation`` if ``request.get_host()`` is called. For full details
+see the documentation for the :setting:`ALLOWED_HOSTS` setting.
+
+The default value for this setting in Django 1.3.6 is `['*']` (matching any
+host), for backwards-compatibility, but we strongly encourage all sites to set
+a more restrictive value.
+
+This host validation is disabled when ``DEBUG`` is ``True`` or when running tests.
diff --git a/docs/releases/index.txt b/docs/releases/index.txt
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ Final releases
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
+   1.3.6
    1.3.1
    1.3
 
diff --git a/tests/regressiontests/requests/tests.py b/tests/regressiontests/requests/tests.py
@@ -63,43 +63,49 @@ def test_httprequest_location(self):
             'http://www.example.com/path/with:colons')
 
     def test_http_get_host(self):
-        old_USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST
+        _old_USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST
+        _old_ALLOWED_HOSTS = settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS
         try:
             settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = False
+            settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS = [
+                'forward.com', 'example.com', 'internal.com', '12.34.56.78',
+                '[2001:19f0:feee::dead:beef:cafe]', 'xn--4ca9at.com',
+                '.multitenant.com', 'INSENSITIVE.com',
+                ]
 
             # Check if X_FORWARDED_HOST is provided.
             request = HttpRequest()
             request.META = {
-                u'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_HOST': u'forward.com',
-                u'HTTP_HOST': u'example.com',
-                u'SERVER_NAME': u'internal.com',
-                u'SERVER_PORT': 80,
+                'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_HOST': 'forward.com',
+                'HTTP_HOST': 'example.com',
+                'SERVER_NAME': 'internal.com',
+                'SERVER_PORT': 80,
             }
             # X_FORWARDED_HOST is ignored.
             self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'example.com')
 
             # Check if X_FORWARDED_HOST isn't provided.
             request = HttpRequest()
             request.META = {
-                u'HTTP_HOST': u'example.com',
-                u'SERVER_NAME': u'internal.com',
-                u'SERVER_PORT': 80,
+                'HTTP_HOST': 'example.com',
+                'SERVER_NAME': 'internal.com',
+                'SERVER_PORT': 80,
             }
             self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'example.com')
 
             # Check if HTTP_HOST isn't provided.
             request = HttpRequest()
             request.META = {
-                u'SERVER_NAME': u'internal.com',
-                u'SERVER_PORT': 80,
+                'SERVER_NAME': 'internal.com',
+                'SERVER_PORT': 80,
             }
             self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'internal.com')
 
             # Check if HTTP_HOST isn't provided, and we're on a nonstandard port
             request = HttpRequest()
             request.META = {
-                u'SERVER_NAME': u'internal.com',
-                u'SERVER_PORT': 8042,
+                'SERVER_NAME': 'internal.com',
+                'SERVER_PORT': 8042,
             }
             self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'internal.com:8042')
 
@@ -112,6 +118,9 @@ def test_http_get_host(self):
                 '[2001:19f0:feee::dead:beef:cafe]',
                 '[2001:19f0:feee::dead:beef:cafe]:8080',
                 'xn--4ca9at.com', # Punnycode for öäü.com
+                'anything.multitenant.com',
+                'multitenant.com',
+                'insensitive.com',
             ]
 
             poisoned_hosts = [
@@ -120,6 +129,7 @@ def test_http_get_host(self):
                 'example.com:dr.frankenstein@evil.tld:80',
                 'example.com:80/badpath',
                 'example.com: recovermypassword.com',
+                'other.com', # not in ALLOWED_HOSTS
             ]
 
             for host in legit_hosts:
@@ -130,55 +140,57 @@ def test_http_get_host(self):
                 request.get_host()
 
             for host in poisoned_hosts:
-                def test_host_poisoning():
+                def _test():
                     request = HttpRequest()
                     request.META = {
                         'HTTP_HOST': host,
                     }
                     request.get_host()
-                self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation, test_host_poisoning)
-
+                self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation, _test)
         finally:
-            settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = old_USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST
+            settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS = _old_ALLOWED_HOSTS
+            settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = _old_USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST
 
     def test_http_get_host_with_x_forwarded_host(self):
-        old_USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST
+        _old_USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST
+        _old_ALLOWED_HOSTS = settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS
         try:
             settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = True
+            settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']
 
             # Check if X_FORWARDED_HOST is provided.
             request = HttpRequest()
             request.META = {
-                u'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_HOST': u'forward.com',
-                u'HTTP_HOST': u'example.com',
-                u'SERVER_NAME': u'internal.com',
-                u'SERVER_PORT': 80,
+                'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_HOST': 'forward.com',
+                'HTTP_HOST': 'example.com',
+                'SERVER_NAME': 'internal.com',
+                'SERVER_PORT': 80,
             }
             # X_FORWARDED_HOST is obeyed.
             self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'forward.com')
 
             # Check if X_FORWARDED_HOST isn't provided.
             request = HttpRequest()
             request.META = {
-                u'HTTP_HOST': u'example.com',
-                u'SERVER_NAME': u'internal.com',
-                u'SERVER_PORT': 80,
+                'HTTP_HOST': 'example.com',
+                'SERVER_NAME': 'internal.com',
+                'SERVER_PORT': 80,
             }
             self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'example.com')
 
             # Check if HTTP_HOST isn't provided.
             request = HttpRequest()
             request.META = {
-                u'SERVER_NAME': u'internal.com',
-                u'SERVER_PORT': 80,
+                'SERVER_NAME': 'internal.com',
+                'SERVER_PORT': 80,
             }
             self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'internal.com')
 
             # Check if HTTP_HOST isn't provided, and we're on a nonstandard port
             request = HttpRequest()
             request.META = {
-                u'SERVER_NAME': u'internal.com',
-                u'SERVER_PORT': 8042,
+                'SERVER_NAME': 'internal.com',
+                'SERVER_PORT': 8042,
             }
             self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'internal.com:8042')
 
@@ -209,16 +221,33 @@ def test_http_get_host_with_x_forwarded_host(self):
                 request.get_host()
 
             for host in poisoned_hosts:
-                def test_host_poisoning():
+                def _test():
                     request = HttpRequest()
                     request.META = {
                         'HTTP_HOST': host,
                     }
                     request.get_host()
-                self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation, test_host_poisoning)
+                self.assertRaises(SuspiciousOperation, _test)
+        finally:
+            settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS = _old_ALLOWED_HOSTS
+            settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = _old_USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST
+
+    def test_host_validation_disabled_in_debug_mode(self):
+        """If ALLOWED_HOSTS is empty and DEBUG is True, all hosts pass."""
+        _old_DEBUG = settings.DEBUG
+        _old_ALLOWED_HOSTS = settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS
+        try:
+            settings.DEBUG = True
+            settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS = []
 
+            request = HttpRequest()
+            request.META = {
+                'HTTP_HOST': 'example.com',
+            }
+            self.assertEqual(request.get_host(), 'example.com')
         finally:
-            settings.USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = old_USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST
+            settings.DEBUG = _old_DEBUG
+            settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS = _old_ALLOWED_HOSTS
 
     def test_near_expiration(self):
         "Cookie will expire when an near expiration time is provided"
