[1.5.x] Restricted the XML deserializer to prevent DoS attacks.

carljm · carljm · commit 2d0c22e02db4 · 2013-02-19T10:39:03.000-07:00
This is a security fix. Disclosure and advisory coming shortly.
diff --git a/django/core/serializers/xml_serializer.py b/django/core/serializers/xml_serializer.py
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 from django.utils.xmlutils import SimplerXMLGenerator
 from django.utils.encoding import smart_text
 from xml.dom import pulldom
+from xml.sax import handler
+from xml.sax.expatreader import ExpatParser as _ExpatParser
 
 class Serializer(base.Serializer):
     """
@@ -151,9 +153,13 @@ class Deserializer(base.Deserializer):
 
     def __init__(self, stream_or_string, **options):
         super(Deserializer, self).__init__(stream_or_string, **options)
-        self.event_stream = pulldom.parse(self.stream)
+        self.event_stream = pulldom.parse(self.stream, self._make_parser())
         self.db = options.pop('using', DEFAULT_DB_ALIAS)
 
+    def _make_parser(self):
+        """Create a hardened XML parser (no custom/external entities)."""
+        return DefusedExpatParser()
+
     def __next__(self):
         for event, node in self.event_stream:
             if event == "START_ELEMENT" and node.nodeName == "object":
@@ -292,3 +298,90 @@ def getInnerText(node):
         else:
            pass
     return "".join(inner_text)
+
+
+# Below code based on Christian Heimes' defusedxml
+
+
+class DefusedExpatParser(_ExpatParser):
+    """
+    An expat parser hardened against XML bomb attacks.
+
+    Forbids DTDs, external entity references
+
+    """
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        _ExpatParser.__init__(self, *args, **kwargs)
+        self.setFeature(handler.feature_external_ges, False)
+        self.setFeature(handler.feature_external_pes, False)
+
+    def start_doctype_decl(self, name, sysid, pubid, has_internal_subset):
+        raise DTDForbidden(name, sysid, pubid)
+
+    def entity_decl(self, name, is_parameter_entity, value, base,
+                    sysid, pubid, notation_name):
+        raise EntitiesForbidden(name, value, base, sysid, pubid, notation_name)
+
+    def unparsed_entity_decl(self, name, base, sysid, pubid, notation_name):
+        # expat 1.2
+        raise EntitiesForbidden(name, None, base, sysid, pubid, notation_name)
+
+    def external_entity_ref_handler(self, context, base, sysid, pubid):
+        raise ExternalReferenceForbidden(context, base, sysid, pubid)
+
+    def reset(self):
+        _ExpatParser.reset(self)
+        parser = self._parser
+        parser.StartDoctypeDeclHandler = self.start_doctype_decl
+        parser.EntityDeclHandler = self.entity_decl
+        parser.UnparsedEntityDeclHandler = self.unparsed_entity_decl
+        parser.ExternalEntityRefHandler = self.external_entity_ref_handler
+
+
+class DefusedXmlException(ValueError):
+    """Base exception."""
+    def __repr__(self):
+        return str(self)
+
+
+class DTDForbidden(DefusedXmlException):
+    """Document type definition is forbidden."""
+    def __init__(self, name, sysid, pubid):
+        super(DTDForbidden, self).__init__()
+        self.name = name
+        self.sysid = sysid
+        self.pubid = pubid
+
+    def __str__(self):
+        tpl = "DTDForbidden(name='{}', system_id={!r}, public_id={!r})"
+        return tpl.format(self.name, self.sysid, self.pubid)
+
+
+class EntitiesForbidden(DefusedXmlException):
+    """Entity definition is forbidden."""
+    def __init__(self, name, value, base, sysid, pubid, notation_name):
+        super(EntitiesForbidden, self).__init__()
+        self.name = name
+        self.value = value
+        self.base = base
+        self.sysid = sysid
+        self.pubid = pubid
+        self.notation_name = notation_name
+
+    def __str__(self):
+        tpl = "EntitiesForbidden(name='{}', system_id={!r}, public_id={!r})"
+        return tpl.format(self.name, self.sysid, self.pubid)
+
+
+class ExternalReferenceForbidden(DefusedXmlException):
+    """Resolving an external reference is forbidden."""
+    def __init__(self, context, base, sysid, pubid):
+        super(ExternalReferenceForbidden, self).__init__()
+        self.context = context
+        self.base = base
+        self.sysid = sysid
+        self.pubid = pubid
+
+    def __str__(self):
+        tpl = "ExternalReferenceForbidden(system_id='{}', public_id={})"
+        return tpl.format(self.sysid, self.pubid)
diff --git a/tests/regressiontests/serializers_regress/tests.py b/tests/regressiontests/serializers_regress/tests.py
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 import datetime
 import decimal
+from django.core.serializers.xml_serializer import DTDForbidden
 
 try:
     import yaml
@@ -515,3 +516,17 @@ def streamTest(format, self):
     if format != 'python':
         setattr(SerializerTests, 'test_' + format + '_serializer_stream', curry(streamTest, format))
 
+
+class XmlDeserializerSecurityTests(TestCase):
+
+    def test_no_dtd(self):
+        """
+        The XML deserializer shouldn't allow a DTD.
+
+        This is the most straightforward way to prevent all entity definitions
+        and avoid both external entities and entity-expansion attacks.
+
+        """
+        xml = '<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?><!DOCTYPE example SYSTEM "http://example.com/example.dtd">'
+        with self.assertRaises(DTDForbidden):
+            next(serializers.deserialize('xml', xml))
